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of us, in rare moments of total honesty, have at least glimpsed. Any solution 
to this problem comes at a price. Any solution commits one to saying things 
that, other things being equal, one would rather not say. One may eventually 
convince oneself that they're worth saying, and perhaps even that they are, 
on reflection, not as implausible as one initially thought. But few of us ever 
escape entirely from the penumbra of that initial implausibility. Zagzebski 
does a fairly good job of pointing to the shadows of doubt which beset her 
competitors' stances. My fear is that her solutions are accompanied by shad-
ows at least as deep. 
Mystic Union: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism, by Nelson Pike. 
(Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1992. Pp. xiv & 224. N.p. 
WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
An apter subtitle of this excellent volume would be "an essay in the phe-
nomenology of Christian mysticism." Pike's book is divided into two parts. 
Its first four chapters gather the data. The last four are "more critical" and 
"provide a phenomenological account that fits the data assembled in the first 
half of the book" (xiii). It concludes with three supplementary studies. The 
first argues that (contrary to the standard interpretation) R.e. Zaehner didn't 
think that monistic and theistic mystical experiences are phenomenologically 
distinct. Monistic and theistic mystics interpret their states differently, and 
react to them differently, but their experiences are the same. The second 
criticizes Steven Katz's account of Christian mysticism, and the third attacks 
Stace's contention that theistic mystics are irrational in not accepting the 
monistic implications of their experiences of undifferentiated unity. I will 
summarize Pike's argument and conclude with three critical comments. 
The first two chapters describe the three principal forms of mystical prayer. 
The soul is directly aware of God in each but the degree of intimacy and the 
place of encounter differ. In the Prayer of Quiet, "God and the soul are close 
to each other" (5). In Full Union and (the culmination of) Rapture, however, 
they penetrate each other; God and the soul are held in mutual embrace. In 
the Prayer of Quiet and Full Union, the encounter between self and God takes 
place within the soul of the mystic. In Rapture, it transpires outside the 
mystic's soul. Quiet and Union thus differ with respect to the nature of the 
encounter but are alike with respect to its domain. In Full Union and Rapture, 
the nature of the encounter is the same but its place differs. 
Full Union and Rapture sometimes culminate in Union without Distinction. 
In this state, the mystic no longer distinguishes between herself and God; 
God is not experienced as a "not-me." Yet "the awareness of self can emerge 
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only in the case where I am aware of. .. something experienced as not-me." 
Hence, "the experience as a whole is ... bereft of a sense of self' (32). "Phe-
nomenologically, where there is no object, the self is 'naughted', does not 
exist" (33). Although the Christian mystic believes that "metaphysically there 
is duality," "phenomenologically there is identity" (37). Pike thinks that Un-
ion without Distinction shouldn't "be thought of as a distinct kind of mystical 
experience. It is, rather, the climax moment - seldom achieved - of ... Full 
Union and Rapture" (40). 
Chapter 3 discusses the doctrine of the spiritual senses. According to this 
doctrine there are "five spiritual sense faculties" bearing "some likeness to 
the exterior senses" (Teresa) "by which God's presence in the various states 
of union is detected" (42). As Pike understands it, when the Christian mystic 
"claims to have 'seen' God, or to have 'smelled' or 'tasted'" Him, she "means 
to be affirming that God was detected in the encounter via actual sensations 
that are at least similar ... to the bodily perceptions usually identified with these 
terms" (44). 
Sight, hearing, and smell are distance senses. (I not only see things at a 
distance, I hear what is going on in the next room, and smell what is cooking 
in the kitchen when I am in the hall. Touch typically requires contact but I 
can feel the fire while standing at some distance from it.) In the Prayer of 
Quiet, God and the soul "are close but not so close as to preclude them coming 
closer." "In Full Union and ... Rapture, God and the soul are in double em-
brace" (49). One would therefore expect God to be detected by analogues of 
the distance senses in the Prayer of Quiet, and to be detected by analogues 
of taste and touch in Full Union and Rapture. 
According to Pike this is exactly what we find. In the Prayer of Quiet, God 
is "heard," "smelled," and "touched" "in the restricted sense appropriate 
when the object perceived is still at some distance from the perceiver" (51). 
(Thus "Teresa says that the soul feels the heat coming from the 'interior 
depths'" (50)). In Full Union and Rapture, God is touched and tasted. 
There are, however, anamolies. (1) Although sight is the paradigmatic dis-
tance sense, spiritual sight is seldom if ever associated with the Prayer of 
Quiet. It is, however, frequently mentioned in connection with Full Union, 
and is especially associated with Rapture. (2) The object of (for example) 
spiritual taste is God's "sweetness," and the object of spiritual touch is His 
"caress" or "touch." But while the object of spiritual sight is sometimes God 
or the Trinity, it is often a divine attribute like power, justice, or wisdom. At 
this point the analogy breaks down, for "their counterparts in the mundane 
world ... are simply not the kinds of things that one sees" (60f). 
Pike concludes his review of the data (chapter 4) with an excellent discus-
sion of the Christian mystic's use of bridal and mother-child imagery, and a 
defense of its appropriateness. 
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Pike's last four chapters are an extended defense of the claim that Christian 
mystical experiences are phenomenologically of God and are therefore dis-
tinct from the states reported by nontheistic mystics. 
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss Walter Stace. Pike distinguishes between "ex-
panded and unexpanded," and "extended and non-extended," descriptions of 
an experience. An expanded description refers to items not included in the 
experience itself. An extended description implies that the experienced items 
really exist. Pike suggests that pure descriptions in Stace's sense are unex-
panded and non-extended. Expanded or extended descriptions are interpreta-
tions. Stace believes that Christians who claim to experience union with God 
are interpreting and not describing their experiences. Their "descriptions" are 
obviously extended. They are also expanded. Their experiences are in fact 
introvertive (by which Stace means radically unitary, devoid of subject-object 
structure and intentional content). Yet they are "described as having a sub-
ject-object structure, and the [object] in question is understood to possess all 
the identifying attributes of the Christian God" (103). Stace concludes that 
Christian mystical experiences aren't phenomenologically of God; there are 
no essentially theistic mystical experiences. Christian or Muslim mystics are 
simply (mis)interpreting experiences they share with Buddhists, Yogins and 
Advaitins. Stace supports his thesis by (1) citing texts which describe Union 
without Distinction, (2) calling attention to the use of "emptiness" metaphors 
("desert," "nakedness," "silence," "darkness," and so on), (3) contending that 
the writings of most Christian mystics exhibit a "definite 'drift towards mo-
nism'" (104) which is inhibited by ecclesiastical pressure, and (4) arguing 
that "it is natural to suppose" that mystics like Tauler or Eckhart and mystics 
like Teresa who don't explicitly mention Union without Distinction, habitu-
ally employ emptiness metaphors, or exhibit a drift towards monism "all 
mean the same thing" by "union with God" "unless given positive evidence 
to the contrary" (105). 
Pike rightly finds this unconvincing. (1) Stace has no explanation of the 
fact that Christian mystics employ three different descriptions (Quiet, Union, 
and Rapture) to refer to what (on Stace's view) is the same experience. (2) 
While metaphysical dualism is "an item of orthodox faith," "that God is 
sometimes close to the soul in its own domain ... and at other times enwraps 
and penetrates the soul either in its own domain ... or in ... 'another world'" is 
not (110). The mystics' use of these descriptions can't be plausibly explained 
as the result of ecclesiastical pressure. (3) Nor can Stace account for the fact 
that Christian mystics insist that their experiences of union "are amply sup-
plied with experential elements explicitly said to be like bodily sensations-
the (so called) 'spiritual sensations'" (Ill). Pike concludes that it is more 
natural to suppose that Christian mystics are describing three distinct (though 
related) states each of which is phenomenologically of God, and that Stace's 
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introvertive experience can at best only be identified with Union without 
Distinction in which Full Union and Rapture sometimes culminate. 
Chapter 7 defends the possibility of phenomenologically theistic experi-
ences against the objections of William Forgie. According to Pike, that one's 
experience is phenomenologically of God can be "an immediate datum of the 
experience" (just as that the unseen person beside me is the president can be 
an immediate datum of my dream) (120). Forgie, on the other hand, thinks 
that "it is implausible to suppose that one and only one individual could 
appear in some particular way" (122). If he is right, that one's experience is 
of that individual is never part of the phenomenological content of one's 
experience. The core of Pike's reply appears to be this. (1) There are many 
perceptual experiences in which "the identification element" is "not the prod-
uct of an inference or ajudgment based on perception." That one is perceiving 
so and so is "directly or immediately presented" (142). Examples are per-
ceiving one's coffee maker on the counter as one enters the kitchen on a sunny 
morning, and Teresa's intellectual vision of Christ in which she percei ved His 
presence at her side although her experience was devoid of sensory imagery. 
(2) Criticisms like Forgie's confuse phenomenological and epistemological 
issues. "To justify my claim that the object I see in the kitchen is a coffee 
maker," I may be forced to appeal to the object's look, feel, etc (141). Certain 
aspects of the phenomenological given may, then, be epistemologically prior 
to others. It doesn't follow that these are the only aspects directly presented. 
(Whether this distinction can be drawn in the case of Teresa's intellectual 
vision is doubtful. For, in this case, nothing clearly corresponds to the object 
on my kitchen counter's look and feel. By the same token, though, there is 
no "appearance," and therefore no appearance which could have been pro-
duced by an individual other than Christ. But Pike would disagree. For he 
not only distinguishes the '''its Jesus' identification element" in her experi-
ence from her "awareness of a presence" (145£); he also insists that although 
the "identification element was not accompanied by the kinds of sensory data 
ordinarily constitutive of perceptions of a person standing at one's side" 
(149), spiritual analogues of these data were.) 
Pike's concluding chapter summarizes his results and offers comments on 
method. Its most interesting feature is an ingenious defense of the claim that 
Unity without Distinction is phenomenologically of God. (More on this in a 
moment.) 
Pike's argument throughout Mystic Union is lucid, invariably interesting 
and, for the most part, persuasive. Yet questions can be raised about his 
discussion of the spiritual senses, his defense of the claim that Union without 
Distinction is phenomenologically of God, and his treatment of Zaehner. 
1. The fact that the paradigmatic distance sense (sight) comes into play 
only in Full Union and Rapture in which God and the soul indwell one another 
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and are therefore not at a distance, and that there are no divine analogues of 
the objects of ordinary visual experience (color, shape, etc.) suggests that the 
doctrine of the spiritual senses imposes an overly rigid conceptual scheme 
on a somewhat unsystematic and fluid use of perceptual metaphors. 
It would be useful to pursue the following questions: (a) Does the frequent 
use of a pair of perceptual metaphors (e.g., touch and taste) by a mystic 
always consistently reflect a phenomenological difference in that mystic's 
experience? (b) Do different mystics using the same perceptual term invari-
ably refer to the same phenomenological feature of mystical experience? (c) 
Is the systematic use of all five perceptual terms typical of Christian mystics 
generally? (Pike's discussion of the spiritual senses reflects his heavy reliance 
on John of the Cross and especially Teresa. The weight he assigns them isn't 
unreasonable given the fullness of their descriptions and their clarity, their 
standing in the Roman Catholic community [both are "doctors of the 
church"], and their importance in the history of Christian mysticism. Their 
paradigmatic status in Pike's book also has important precedents in the work 
of Poulain, Parges, Maritain, and others [Parges and Poulain, too, stress the 
doctrine of the spiritual senses.] One nonetheless wonders whether Pike's 
account would have looked the same had he instead focused on Dionysius 
the Areopagite, Maximus, Gregory Palamas, and other mystical luminaries 
of the Eastern church, or on medieval English mystics like Walter Hilton and 
the author of The Cloud of Unknowing, or on Rhineland mystics like Eckart, 
Tauler, and the author of the Theologia Germanica.) (d) Does the doctrine 
occur in other theistic mystical traditions which contain analogues of Quiet, 
Union, and Rapture? 
Unless the answer to most of these questions is clearly "Yes," I suggest 
that the notion of the spiritual senses shouldn't be taken too literally. The 
metaphors may only be designed to express intimacy (touch, taste), delight 
(sweetness, fragrance), and varying degrees of perceptual clarity. (One could 
then explain why sight isn't used in association with the Prayer of Quiet. 
Vision has been traditionally regarded as the most intellectual of the senses 
and one's awareness of God at this stage is relatively obscure.) One should 
consider the possibility, in other words, that expressions like "sight," "smell," 
"taste," and so forth refer to only a few phenomenal qualities (the ones I have 
mentioned or others) each of which can perhaps be indifferently picked out 
by more than one perceptual metaphor. 
2. Pike claims that even though Union without Distinction is "a monistic 
interval lacking subject-object structure as well as all sensory and sensory-
like content" (160), it is "phenomenologically theistic" (162). Pike employs 
two analogies to explain how this can be true. (a) Imagine two cases. In the 
first, "I am sitting on a park bench reading a magazine when I am unexpect-
edly hit on the forehead with a baseball. Upon awakening" I describe my 
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experience as "stun-stars and fading consciousness ... .1 am later told what 
happened" and "thereafter ... describe the experience as one of being hit on the 
head by a baseball." In the second, I am playing second base, follow the ball 
as it leaves the plate. move under it "but...I misjudge the catch and the ball 
hits me on the forehead. Again, I experience stun-stars and fading conscious-
ness. Upon awakening I do not have to be told what happened. I describe the 
experience as one of being hit on the head with a baseball." "Being hit with 
a baseball" describes something I perceive in the second case but not in the 
first. Because of its "phenomenological ancestry". stun-stars and fading con-
sciousness in case two is "phenomenologically [an experience] of being hit 
with a ball." While the two occurrences of stun-stars and fading consciousness 
are "phenomenologically indistinguishable in that they involved the same kind 
of stun, the same kind of stars. [etc.] ...• they are phenomenologically distinct. 
'Hit with a baseball' describes the phenomenological content of the second 
experience. It does not do so with respect to the first" (162-3). (b) Again imagine 
two cases. In the first. a spot of light is projected on a screen. In the second. 
two spots are projected and "come closer and closer together until they merge 
into a single ... spot" "having the same spatial dimensions, brightness. and so 
on." My awareness in the second case "is not just a perception of unity but 
a perception of identity--not just a perception of one but of two that have 
become one .... With respect to this final moment of awareness ... , its pheno-
menological ancestry has survived as an ingredient in its phenomenological 
content" (164). The implication is clear. Union without Distinction is 
"empty." Yet, in virtue of its phenomenological ancestry, it can be described 
as, phenomenologically, "an awareness of God-soul identity. ... 'God-soul 
identity' expresses a lack of experential content. But.. . .it is a very specific 
lack." namely, a lack of the previously "felt distinction between oneself and 
God." (164-5) Pike concludes that whether or not Stace's experience of un-
differentiated unity is phenomenologically theistic or not is determined by 
its phenomenological history. 
I find Pike's claim puzzling. It is true that the experiential sequences in 
each pair of cases are phenomenologically distinct. It is also true that, because 
of its phenomenological ancestry, the second instance of stun-stars and fading 
consciousness (for example) can be described as being phenomenologically 
an experience of being hit by a baseball while the first cannot. (I am pheno-
menologically aware of being hit by a baseball in the second case but not in 
the first.) But Pike wants to say more than this, namely, that the pheno-
menological content of the climax moment (stun-stars and fading conscious-
ness. the perception of a single dot, the experience of undifferentiated unity) 
differs in the two cases. 
It would do so if an awareness of the climax moment's ancestry were 
included in the climax moment. or if its phenomenological ancestry affected 
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its feeling tone. But of course in that case the climax moments of the two 
sequences would be internally distinct in virtue of the fact that one contains 
a phenomenological element that the other lacks. And Pike apparently doesn't 
intend this. (He compares the climax moments of the first pair of sequences 
to a picture of Jones which has been cropped from a picture of Jones standing 
third from the left in the front row of his graduating class, and the uncropped 
picture. The second but not the first is "pictorially [read: phenomenologi-
cally] of Jones-standing-third-from-the-Ieft-in-the-front-row" [164]. But no-
tice that there are no internal differences between the cropped picture of 
Jones and the portion of the uncropped picture from which it was taken. Then 
too, Stace's experience of undifferentiated unity is devoid of content. If this 
state is internally identical with Union without Distinction [as Pike seems to 
think], an awareness of the climax moment's phenomenological ancestry 
can't be part of it.) 
Its feeling tone, I suppose, could. Or at least two experiences which are 
devoid of intentional content might differ with respect to their affective 
coloring. (This is a real possibility. The empty-consciousness experience is 
usually joyful. But not always. J. A. Symonds had it and disliked it.) I am 
not sure that Pike would accept this suggestion. (His photograph example 
suggests he might not.) Yet ifhe doesn't accept it or something like it, we are 
left with the apparently inconsistent assertion that two internally indistin-
guishable experiential moments differ in their phenomenological content and 
thus are not internally indistinguishable after all. (His analogies don't really 
help. For, arguably, an implicit awareness of the experience's causal ancestry 
is included in the second perception of the spot of light, and is not an internal 
part of the second occurrence of stun-stars and fading consciousness [al-
though it is an essential feature of the second baseman's experience as a 
whole.] The first is therefore dis analogous to Union without Distinction be-
cause the latter doesn't include an awareness of its causal ancestry as an 
ingredient. And since "being hit with a baseball" isn't clearly part of the 
second's phenomenological content [although it is part of the phenomenologi-
cal content of its immediate experiential predecessor] the example of the 
second baseman doesn't help us see how "being one with God" could be an 
ingredient in the climax moment of Full Union and Rapture.) 
3. I wasn't fully convinced by Pike's ingenious and controversial interpre-
tation of Zaehner. (a) Zaehner frequently speaks in ways which imply that 
monistic and theistic mystics have different experiences. (Cf. e.g., Mysticism: 
Sacred and Profane [Oxford, 1956], pages 182, 189, and 205.) (b) The doc-
trinal and behavioral differences between monistic and theistic mystics can 
be taken as indirect evidence that their experiences differ. Zaehner, I think, 
intends them to be so taken. (c) Zaehner often speaks as if monistic experi-
ences are a preparation for theistic experiences. (Cf. e.g., Myticism: Sacred 
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and Profane, pages 182, 194, and 204, and Concordant Discord [Oxford, 
1970], pages 203-205.) If so, they can't be identical. (d) Zaehner cites texts 
to show that theistic mystics sometimes distinguish between monistic and 
theistic states on the basis of their own first hand experience. (Cf. e.g., 
Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, page 189, and Zaehner's discussion of 
Ramanuja and al-Junayd in Hindu and Muslim Mysticism [London, 1960].) 
This too implies that the experiences differ. (e) Zaehner not only thinks that 
theistic mystics differ doctrinally and behaviorally from monistic mystics; he 
also believes that the mystical states of the former are an enjoyment of God 
while those of the latter are (only) an enjoyment of (the unity of) their own 
souls. I find it hard to believe that Zaehner would have thought that one and 
the same phenomenological state could either be an enjoyment of God or an 
enjoyment of one's own soul depending on the behavioral and doctrinal 
context in which it occurs. 
But these are quibbles. Pike's book is a major contribution to the literature 
on mysticism and to the philosophy of religion in general. It is the best book 
of its kind to have appeared since the important work of Farges, Poulain, and 
Butler in the early part of the century. It is superior to theirs in its analytic 
acumen and philosophical sophistication. I recommend it without reservation. 
Passionate Reason: Making Sense Of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Frag-
ments, by C. Stephen Evans. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1992. Pp. xii and 205. $29.95 (Cloth). 
ROBERT C. ROBERTS, Wheaton College 
Steve Evans's latest book is the third book-length commentary on 
Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments to be published in the last ten years. I 
In a time when books on Kierkegaard are hard to publish and elicit little honor 
from the community of professional philosophers, this much careful attention 
to one booklet (just over 100 pages) in Kierkegaard's large corpus of works 
seems to need explaining. I think the explanation is that Fragments addresses 
an issue of momentous relevance to Christian thought, an issue on which the 
preservation of Christianity itself turns, but couches its pronouncements on 
that issue in an enigmatic format and sometimes in oracular statements that 
seem to undermine its own project of preserving the conceptual integrity of 
Christianity. Thus the booklet seems important, but also seems to call for 
quite a lot of clarifying. 
Unlike Evans's Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript: The Christian Phi-
losophy of Johannes Climacus (Humanities Press, 1983), which treated 
Kierkegaard's whole "Climacus literature" topically, Passionate Reason is a 
more or less chapter-by-chapter discussion just of Fragments. Evans distin-
